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I. INTRODUCTION

In response to an increasing number of complaints from the
business community, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce launched an
investigation into what is known as "sue and settle."2 In its May 2013 report
titled "Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind Closed Doors," the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce found that, between 2009 and 2012, the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") chose not to defend itself in lawsuits brought by
advocacy groups in at least sixty instances. As a result of these settlements,
the EPA has published more than 100 new binding regulations that affect
various industries, which will impose estimated tens of millions, if not
billions, of dollars in compliance costs.4 Although sue-and-settle has been
1 Many thanks to my family for their support, and to Professor Blake Watson for his guidance and
feedback when I felt I was most lost in the weeds that is environmental law.
2 William L. Kovacs, Keith W. Holman & Jonathan A. Jackson, Sue and Settle: Regulating Behind
Closed Doors, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 5 (May 2013), http://www.uschamber.com/sites/
default/files/reports/SUEANDSETTLEREPORT-Final.pdf.
3Id.
4 Id.
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utilized for decades, the EPA has taken advantage of the tactic adding an
estimated $12.1 billion in regulatory costs in 2012 alone. 5
The EPA is an administrative agency with the ability to affect the
rights of private parties in environment-related disputes.6 It carries out its
statutory mandate through informal action, adjudication, rulemaking,
prosecution, negotiations, investigations, and settlements.7 The EPA is
neither a court nor a legislative body and, in simplest terms, the EPA is
cloaked with authority to regulate the private sector's business.' The EPA
has the potential to give the executive branch "untrammelled power to
dictate the vitality and even survival of whatever segments of American
business it might choose."9 From a policy perspective, sue-and-settle can be
very effective. It allows the EPA to effectuate new policy in a more timely
and cost-effective manner than the formal rulemaking processes; however,
sue-and-settle raises several questions. First, is the EPA abusing its
regulatory authority by purposively choosing not to defend lawsuits and
accepting proposed settlements?
Second, does sue-and-settle violate
established principles of political accountability and transparency by
pushing forth a "green" agenda that might otherwise fail to pass in
Congress? Sue-and-settle not only denies affected industries meaningful
participation in the rulemaking process, but with a lack of transparency in
the process, it allows for the passage of a progressive agenda that might not
otherwise pass in Congress or garner significant support amongst voters.
Part II of this Comment sets forth the relevant legal background.
First, it discusses the sue-and-settle tactic, including its origins, and how
frequently it has been used. Second, it discusses the EPA's history in
regulating greenhouse gases. It then discusses the effects on one particular
industry, the coal industry, and newly imposed regulations through the
settlement negotiated in New York v. EPA."° Finally, it discusses the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Clean Air Act ("CAA") to
the extent that they govern rulemaking processes, and the use of each to
bring suits before the courts in order to negotiate settlements.
Part III addresses the implicated constitutional and policy questions.
This Comment argues that, although sue-and-settle has existed for decades,
the tactic is being abused in order to dictate the vitality of the coal industry.

Id.at 14; Sam Batkins, PresidentObama's $488 Billion Regulatory Burden, AMERICAN ACTION
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://americanactionforum.org/research/president-obamas-488-billionregulatory-burden.
6 1CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 44 (3d ed. 2010).
7id.
8Id.
I E.g., Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v.
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't. of Labor, 938 F.2d 1310, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
10 Settlement Agreement at 3, New York v. EPA, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22688 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(No. 06-1322), available at http://www.ect.coop/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/NSPSsetCmts-2.pdf
FORUM
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First, the EPA's promulgation of new regulations through adherence to a
settlement agreement undermines the purpose of the APA and CAA by
denying affected businesses in the coal industry meaningful participation in
the rulemaking process. Second, the tactic of sue-and-settle violates the
theory of political accountability because, for the first time in history, the
EPA is regulating greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired plants absent a
clear congressional mandate. Third, sue-and-settle creates tensions between
the branches of government as current presidential administrations are able
to bind the hands of future administrations; and the executive branch is able
to pursue an agenda absent a congressional mandate. As a solution to the
EPA's abuse of power, this Comment proposes an amendment to the APA,
or passing the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of
2013.

II. BACKGROUND
A. What Is Sue-and-Settle?
Sue-and-settle is the process where an advocacy group files a
lawsuit against an agency alleging the agency failed to fulfill its statutory
requirements.1' In the context of environmental law, the tactic of sue-andsettle occurs when an environmental advocacy group files suit against an
agency alleging it missed a deadline or failed to meet some other regulatory
requirement. 12 Rather than defend itself, the agency chooses to settle the
lawsuit by putting in place the advocacy group's desired regulation. 3 The
negotiation is court-ordered, thus it is legally binding.' 4 Each settlement is
negotiated behind closed doors, and neither the affected industry nor the
public is able to participate in the negotiation.15
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce describes sue-and-settle as a
process where "the agency intentionally transforms itself from an
independent actor that has discretion to perform its duties . . . into an actor
subservient to the binding terms of settlement agreements, which includes
using congressionally appropriated funds to achieve the demands of specific
outside groups."' 6 As a result of this tactic, agencies relinquish statutory
discretion because outside lawsuits filed by advocacy groups "effectively
dictate the priorities and duties of the agency."' 7 Oftentimes, these
" Sheryll Poe, 'Sue and Settle' Threatens Business, FREE ENTERPRISE (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.freeenterprise.com/energy-environment/sue-and-settle-threatens-business.
12 Kovacs, supranote 2, at 10.
" Poe, supra note 11.
14 Id.
15 Kovacs, supranote 2, at 10-11.
16 ld. at 11.
ld. at 3; see also Julian Hattem, Business Groups Pushfor Regulatory Transparency,THE HILL
I'
(Apr. 11, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/legislation/293473-business-groups-pushfor-regulatory-transparency-; Larry Bell, EPA's Secret and Costly 'Sue and Settle' Collusion with
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settlements become the legal authority behind expansive regulatory action as
opposed to legal authority for a new regulation being derived from a bill
passed in Congress.18
Sue-and-settle has been utilized off and on since at least the Carter
Administration by both Republican and Democratic administrations.19 In
addition to environmental groups taking advantage of the tactic, it has also
been utilized by businesses in order to influence the outcome of an EPA
action.2" Several government agencies, including the EPA, the U.S. Forest
Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Land
Management, and the U.S. Department of Commerce have employed this
tactic to their advantage. 2'
While sue-and-settle has been used "occasionally" since the 1970s,
between 2009 and 2012, seventy-one separate lawsuits were settled in a
manner that can be classified as sue-and-settle.22 The U.S. of Chamber of
Commerce found that more than 100 new federal rules were implemented as
a result of the settlements.23 Additionally, in 2011 the U.S. Government
Environmental
Organizations,
FORBES
(Feb.
17,
2013,
8:00
AM),
http://www, forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2013/02/17/epas-secret-and-costly-sue-and-settle-collusion-withenvironmental-organizations/ ("'Consent decrees' are issued based upon a prearranged settlement
agreement [far-left radical environment groups and federal agencies] collaboratively craft together in
advance behind closed doors ... [and] rather than allowing the entire process to play out, the agency
being sued settles the lawsuit by agreeing to move forward with the requested action they and the
litigants both want."); Does EPA 's Sue-and-Settle Policy Circumvent the Legislative, and Regulatory
Process?, THE CALIFORNIAN.COM (Dec. 21, 2013, 6:24 AM), http://www.thecalifomian.com
/article/20131221/OPINION05/312210028/Does-EPA-s-sue-settle-policy-circumvent-legislativeregulatory-process- ("What's more insidious is that once the agency is under the consent decree, future
administrations are bound by it. That means the agency not only loses its own discretion and disregards
congressional priorities, but it deprives future presidents of the ability to change the agency's policy.").
Kovacs, supra note 2, at 11.
19 William Kovacs, Does EPA's Policy to "Sue and Settle" Work Fairly?, ERIE TIMEs-NEWS (Dec.
26, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.goerie.com/article/20131226/OPINION09/312269989/Does-EPA'spolicy-to-'sue-and-settle'-work-fairly/o3F; Kovacs, supra note 2, at 14. Compare Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 36-37 (1982) ("Interestingly, the
settlement of litigation challenging rules has generated little attention in either the literature or regulatory
theory. It is a relatively common occurrence, however, for parties that have challenged a regulation to
negotiate an acceptable agreement. In return for withdrawing the petition challenging the rule, the
agency frequently agrees to publish a change in the regulation as a proposed rule."), with Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, The Attorney General's Policy on Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements, 39
ADMIN. L. REv. 101, 101-102 (1987) (in 1986, U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III issued a policy
forbidding departments and agencies from entering into consent decrees that mandated the revision or
promulgation of regulations).
20 Kovacs, supranote 2, at 14.
21 Id. at 5.

22 Kovacs, supra note 19; Kovacs, supra note 2, at 12. Research revealed sue-and-settle cases
brought under the Clean Air Act have risen under the Obama Administration as compared to past
administrations: twenty-seven cases during President Clinton's second term; thirty-eight cases during
President Bush's first term; twenty-eight cases during President Bush's second term; and sixty cases
during President Obama's first term. Id. at 14.
23 Kovacs, supra note 2, at 12; James L. Gattuso, Reforming Regulations:Some Sensible Steps, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reportsl/2012/07/how-toreduce-red-tape-and-reform-government-regulation ("According to the most recent Heritage Foundation
analysis, 106 major new regulations--each imposing $100 million or more in new costs on Americanswere adopted in the first three years of President Obama's tenure. That compares to 28 during the first
three years under President Bush."); see, e.g., Am. Nurses Assoc. v. Jackson, No. 08-2198, 2010 WL
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Accountability Office issued a report detailing the millions of taxpayer
dollars that courts awarded to environmental groups in connection with EPA
litigation between 1995 and 2011.24 Of the millions awarded to
environmental attorneys, Earthjustice, the Sierra Club, and the Natural
Resources Defense Council received forty-one percent of the money for
suits filed under the CAA and the Clean Water Act ("CWA").i s These costs
also do not include the amount of tax dollars spent on the EPA's attorney
fees.26
B. EPA and the Evolution ofRegulating Greenhouse Gases
The EPA has the authority under the CAA to promulgate
regulations without first finding actual harm to people or the environment.27
In 1976, in Ethyl Corporation v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that a "'will endanger' standard is precautionary in nature and does not
require proof of actual harm before regulation is appropriate."28 In so
ruling, however, the court noted that the application of this principle must be
confined within "reasonable limits."29 Shortly thereafter in 1977, Congress
amended the "endangerment standard" of § 202 of the CAA to "cement the
statute's precautionary and preventative purpose."3 0
In 2007, the 5-4 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA ordered the EPA to
begin regulating greenhouse gases in spite of the EPA initially declining to
do so under § 202 of the CAA. 3
The Court reasoned, "[t]he harms
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized. 3 2 The
Court stopped short of establishing greenhouse gas standards for motor
vehicles at the time, but it concluded that sufficient information existed for
1506913, at *2-3, (D.C. Cir. Apr. 15, 2010) (court granted consent decree requiring EPA to issue
maximum achievable control technology emission standards under § 304(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act for
hazardous air pollutants from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units); see also
WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, Nos. 11-CV-00001, 2011 WL4485964, at *3-4 (D. Colo. Sept. 27,
2011) (granting consent decree to allow EPA to decide for certain states whether to approve or deny State
Implementation Plan ("SIP") submissions).
24 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 1-650, CASES AGAINST EPA AND ASSOCIATED
COSTS OVER TIME, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 14 (2011).
21

Id. at 24; Bell, supra note 17.

26 Bell, supra note 17.
27 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
28 Id.

Id. at n.32, 18.
Erica Rancilio, Massachusetts v. EPA: The D.C. Circuit Stretches Precedent and Ignores the
Statutory Standardto Uphold EPA's Unlawful Rulemaking Petition Denial,20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 207, 209
(2006) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 77 (2007); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)).
31 Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007); see also Nathan Richardson, Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act: Does Chevron v. NRDC Set the EPA Free?, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE 8 (Dec. 2009), http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-09-50.pdf ("The Bush-administration
EPA did not make an endangerment decision under §202 .... ").
32 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521. The issue of whether climate change is a serious or wellrecognized is outside the scope of his comment; however, "[c]arbon dioxide has always been present in
the atmosphere, albeit at varying concentrations." Brief of Landmark Legal Foundation in Support of
Petitioners as Amici Curiae at 16, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C.
Circ. 2012) (No. 12-1268).
29

"
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the EPA to make an Endangerment Finding.33 The case was remanded for
the EPA to determine whether greenhouse gases are air pollutants that
"'endanger public health or welfare.' ' 34
Following the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA
promulgated several rules relating to greenhouse gases.35 The EPA
interpreted the CAA broadly, and admitted the new rules were contrary to
congressional intent, but felt it was nonetheless compelled to issue the rules
under the Massachusetts v. EPA ruling.3 6 In 2009, the EPA issued an
Endangerment Finding under the CAA where it determined that greenhouse
gases may "'reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare."' 37 Then, in 2010, the EPA issued the Tailpipe Rule and set the
greenhouse gas emission standards for cars and light trucks.38 Neither the
Endangerment Finding, nor the Tailpipe Rule explicitly addressed the
EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases emitted from stationary
sources, such as coal-fired power plants; thus, the EPA opted to act
indirectly in order to regulate greenhouse gases from these sources.3 9 In
2012, the EPA promulgated the Timing and Tailoring Rules where it
determined the largest stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions are
required to obtain construction and operating permits.4 °
In 2012, cloaked with authority from Massachusetts v. EPA, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the EPA's regulations of greenhouse
gases under the CAA. 4' In Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation v. EPA,
petitioners, several state and industry groups, challenged the Endangerment
Finding, the Tailpipe Rule, and the Timing and Tailoring Rules arguing they
were "based on improper constructions of the CAA and [were] otherwise
arbitrary and capricious. ",42Th
The Cor
Court of Appeals held the Endangerment
Finding and Tailpipe Rule neither arbitrary, nor capricious, and the EPA's
interpretation of the governing portions of the CAA was unambiguously
correct.43 The Court also held the petitioners lacked jurisdiction to
3 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534-35.
34 Id.at 528-29.
'" Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert denied,
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 26313 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
36 John S. Gray, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA: The Sequel to Massachusetts Arrives, 34 No.

12 WESTLAW JOURNAL ENVIRONMENTAL 1, 3 (Jan. 8, 2014).
31 Coal.for Responsible Regulation,Inc., 684 F.3d at 113 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)); Protection
of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 49.135 (2009); Gray, supranote 36, at 4.
38 Coal.for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 113.
39 Gray, supra note 36, at 5; Settlement Agreement, supranote 10, at 3.

40 Coal.for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 113; see also Protection of Environment, 40
C.F.R. §§ 52.01-39 (2014).
41 Coal.for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 113.
42 Id.

43 Id. Petitions for writs of certiorari were granted for several cases and limited to one question:

"Did the EPA permissibly determine that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles under the Clean Air Act also triggered permit requirements for stationary sources of greenhouse
gas emissions?." Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IT CHICAGO-KENT
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The Supreme Court
challenge the Timing and Tailoring Rules.'
consolidated a group of petitions and granted certiorari to hear challenges to
these EPA regulations on greenhouse gas emissions in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA.45 The issue before the Court was whether the
EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the CAA
for greenhouse gases emitted from stationary sources.4 6
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the Court addressed
whether the EPA permissibly interpreted the CAA to mean that a stationary
source may be required to obtain a permit on the basis that it may potentially
emit greenhouse gases; it also determined that the statute did not compel the
EPA's "greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation" with respect to permitting
programs under the CAA, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
("PSD") program and Title V. 47 The Court reasoned that since 1978, the
EPA's regulations of "air pollutants" with regard to PSD permitting trigger
only as to certain, limited air pollutants, and since 1993 the EPA has
"informally taken the same position" with respect to the air pollutants that
trigger Title V.48 In assessing the EPA's alternative position that "its
interpretation was justified as an exercise of its 'discretion' to adopt 'a
reasonable construction of the statute"' promulgated by the Tailoring Rule,
the Court again concluded the interpretation impermissible.4 9 The Court
held that because the greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the
permitting triggers was not compelled, the EPA's rewriting of the statutory
thresholds in the Tailoring Rule was impermissible.5" The Court noted that
the EPA lacked authority to "tailor" legislation to adhere to "bureaucratic
policy goals" by rewriting clear-cut terms of a statute.51
C. ProposedRegulations as a DirectResult of Sue-and-Settle
On February 27, 2006, the EPA published a final rule, the "2006
COLLEGE OF LAW, (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_12_1146
[hereinafter OYEZ].
4 Coal.for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 684 F.3d at 148.
45 See OYEZ, supra note 43.
46Id.; Gray, supranote 36, at 9.
41 Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014).
48 Id. at 2440.
41 Id. at 2442.
" Id. at 2445.
51 id.
In the Tailoring Rule, [the] EPA asserts newfound authority to regulate millions of
small sources-including retail stores, offices, apartment buildings, shopping
centers, schools, and churches-and to decide, on an ongoing basis and without
regard for the thresholds prescribed by Congress, how many of those sources to
regulate. We are not willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as [the] EPA
embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery. We reaffirm the core
administrative-law principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms
to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.
Id. at 2446.
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Final Rule," revising performance standards for pollutant emissions of
Electronic Generating Units ("EGUs"), or power plants (stationary sources)
that generate electricity from burning fossil fuels such as coal, natural gas,
or petroleum liquids. 2 Several entities, collectively "New York," appealed
to the D.C. Circuit against the EPA.53 As is typical of sue-and-settle,
petitioners included several advocacy groups such as the Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the Environmental Defense Fund, as
well as several states.54 The petitioners argued the 2006 Final Rule was
required to include performance standards for carbon pollutants and other
Following the decision in Massachusetts v.
greenhouse gases for EGUs
EPA, the Court remanded the 2006 Final Rule for consideration by the EPA
given the EPA could now regulate greenhouse gases. 6 Rather than act on
the remand, the petitioners and the EPA negotiated a settlement agreement
in an effort to "avoid further litigation."5 7 The settlement agreement set
deadlines for the EPA to propose a new rule under the CAA that set
performance standards for greenhouse gases for new, modified, and existing
EGUs.5 8
In 2011, the proposed regulation was posted in the Federal Register,
and following a comment period, the EPA concluded the comments did not
give rise to facts or considerations that the settlement agreement was
"inappropriate, improper, inadequate or inconsistent with the CAA."59
According to the terms of the settlement agreement, under § 111 of the
CAA, the EPA must set and regularly update the performance standards for
stationary sources.6 ° Under § 111(b), the set standards apply to new
facilities; that is, new facilities cannot be built (and existing facilities cannot
be modified) unless they meet the standards. 6' Additionally, under § 111 (d),
the EPA has now set guidelines for existing facilities. 62 As a result of sue52 Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 1; see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

SECTOR POLICIES AND PROGRAMS DIVISION, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS:
AVAILABLE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM COALFIRED ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS 1, 5 (Oct. 2010), http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/electric

generation.pdf.
53 Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 1-2.
5'New York v. EPA, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22688, at *1-3 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
" Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 1.
56 New York, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22688, at *3.
11 Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 2; Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22392; Protection
of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 60.40Da (2013).
" Settlement Agreement, supra note 10, at 3; Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22392; Protection
of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 60.4 1Da (2013).
11 Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22392; Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 60.41Da (2013).
o Nathan Richardson, EPA Greenhouse Gas Performance Standards: What the Settlement
Agreement Means, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 3 (Feb. 2011), http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/
RFF-IB- 11-02.pdf.
61 id.
62 Id.
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and-settle, the EPA agreed to implement the first-ever greenhouse gas
regulations for coal-fired power plants.63
D. Administrative ProcedureAct Governing the EPA
1. Background
At its core, administrative law is "the legal vehicle for organizing
and structuring government."'6 It is defined as "'the law concerning the
powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the
law governing judicial review of administrative action."' 65 Congress
delegates to an agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations, and
occasionally the power to hear disputes.66 All regulations issued by an
agency are issued under the authority delegated by a Presidential Executive
Order or a federal statute.67
In terms of decision-making, agencies may engage in both
adjudication and rulemaking.6 8 Rulemaking is similar to the activities
carried out by the legislature where rules are created when an agency wishes
to interpret, implement, or prescribe policy or law.69 Some rules merely
disclose the agency's position about a particular law, and thus have no
binding legal effect. ° Other rules, however, are legally binding and must be
followed unless they are found to be capricious. 7'
Rulemaking encompasses three characteristics: generalized nature;
policy orientation; and prospective applicability. 7
Generalized nature
relates to the policy issues and the general or "'legislative facts supporting a
resolution of those issues." '' 73 Policy orientation refers to fact gathering,
investigation, and determinations made in connection to policies.7 4 In terms
of prospective applicability, rulemaking does not focus on past conduct, but
rather on future conduct. 75 Agencies gather information about past conduct,
63 Richardson, supra note 31, at 4.; Phil Impellizzeri, Overzealous GHG RegulationsAren't the Only
Way the EPA Is Putting the Boots to Kentucky's Energy Sector, BLUEGRASS INSTITUTE (June 13, 2013)
http://www.bipps.org/overzealous-ghg-regulations-arent-the-only-way-the-epa-is-putting-the-boots-to-

kentuckys-energy-sector/; H.R. Rep. No. 113-230, at 4 (2013).
64 KOCH, supra note 6, at 1.
65 Id.at 44.

66 Id. at 44-45 (stating that the NLRB both promulgates regulations, and is also authorized to
adjudicate disputes arising between management and labor unions).
67 Id. at 45.
61 Id. at 70. "Adjudication is a determination of [legal] rights or duties," and is not a function the

EPA generally engages in. Id.
69 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012); KOCH at 71-72; Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative
Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95, 106 (2003) ("Rulemaking is a generic term for
legislation ...").
70 KOCH, supranote 6, at 72.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 73.

75 ld.
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but solely for the purpose of making judgments that will have a prospective
76

effect.

"Before 1936, no official source for publication of rules and
regulations of federal agencies existed."77 Because of the confusion
stemming from not knowing whether a proposed action was prohibited by a
78
federal agency, Congress passed the Federal Register Act ("FRA").
According to the FRA, any agency that issues a rule with "general
79
applicability and legal effect must be published in the FederalRegister.
"[G]eneral applicability and legal effect" is defined as "'any document
issued under proper authority prescribing a penalty or course of conduct,
conferring a right, privilege, authority, or immunity, or imposing an
obligation, [which is] relevant or applicable to the general public. ... ""
Although the public had access to all rules and regulations
promulgated by federal agencies, the public had no right to participate in the
process and procedures of rulemaking. 8' In 1946, Congress passed the APA
in an attempt to address the situation.82 The APA granted the public the
right to engage in the rulemaking process by compelling agencies to publish
their proposed regulations in the Federal Register so that the public had the
opportunity to comment. 3 In order to improve the public's access to agency
practices and procedures, Congress subsequently passed three more statutes:
the Freedom of Information Act, the Government in the Sunshine Act, and
the Regulatory Flexibility Act ("RFA").84 Passed in 1966, the Freedom of
Information Act requires agencies publish in the Federal Register
descriptions of their organizations, their rules of procedure, and policy
statements and interpretations.8 5 The Government in the Sunshine Act of
1976 was then passed to compel agencies to publish notices of meetings in
the Federal Register.86
In 1980, the RFA was passed. 87 According to the RFA, agencies
must perform "regulatory flexibility analysis" in their rule making
processes.88 Under regulatory flexibility analysis, agencies must publish an
agenda in the Federal Register every spring and fall. 89 The agenda must
76

Id.

Id. at 45.
71 Id. at 46; see also 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-11 (2012).
77

79 KOCH, supranote 6, at 46.
80

Id.
"' Id. at 47.
82 Id.

Id.
4 Id.
85 id.
9 Id.
87 id.
83

'8 Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L. J. 213, 215

(1982).
89 KOCH, supranote 6, at 47-48.
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include the subject details of any rule the agency expects to promulgate that
will have a significant economic impact on a considerable number of small
entities, a summary of the rules being considered, including their objectives
and the legal basis for each, and the name and contact information of the
agency official with knowledge of the rule.9"
The RFA was passed in response to the concerns of small
businesses to increasing government regulation. 9 Rather than mandating a
particular outcome in an agency's rulemaking processes, the RFA requires
consideration of alternatives to proposed regulations that are less
burdensome to small businesses, and an explanation as to why the
alternatives were rejected by the agency. 92 When an agency promulgates its
final rule, it must make its regulatory flexibility analysis available at the
same time (or in the case of an emergency, within 180 days from the date of
the final rule's publication).9 3 If the agency fails to publish the required
regulatory flexibility analysis, the rule is invalid.94 The analysis must
include a summary of the issued raised in public comments, a summary of
the agency's assessment of those comments, a statement of any changes
made in the proposed rule as a result of those comments, a description of the
significant alternatives to the rule that are consistent with the regulatory
objectives, and a statement as to why the alternatives were rejected. 95
2. Administrative Procedure Act as it Governs the EPA
The APA imposes three requirements on agencies and their
administrative processes.96 First, the APA requires that various agency
actions be made public. 97 Second, it imposes procedural requirements in
rulemaking, including publishing the proposed version of the rule and
allowing a private party-comment period.9 8 Third, once all the comments
have been received, the APA then requires the agency publish the final rule
with a statement of the legal basis and purpose of the rule.99 Additionally,
through judicial review, the APA allows for aggrieved parties to challenge
the rule or agency action in court on the grounds that it is either
unconstitutional or violates a federal statute, including the procedural
requirements of the APA.1 °°
90 Id.

9' Verkuil, supra note 88, at 215-16.
92 Id. at 230.
13 5 U.S.C. § 604 (2012); Doris S. Freedman, The Regulatory Flexibility Act: OrientingFederal
Regulation to Small Business, 93 DICK. L. REV. 439, 447 (1989).
94 Freedman, supra note 93, at 447.
95

Id.

96 Rubin, supranote 69, at 100.
97 Id.

91 Id. at 100-01.
99 Id. at 101.
100

Id.
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When it comes to agency rulemaking, the APA is the default rule.1"°
Specific statutes, such as the CAA, may modify rulemaking processes and
procedures. 102 Specifically, the CAA sets out statutory procedures "that
require considerably more of all participants than do the simple notice-andcomment requirements of the [APA]," such as requiring both the EPA and
other participants in the rulemaking to follow supplementary rules designed
to probe the issues at stake and create a record for judicial review.0 3
Section 307(d) of the CAA applies to most of the EPA's actions under this
particular statute."° Actions taken under the CAA include the promulgation
or revision of National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"), Federal
Implementation Plans ("FIPs"), and most rules relating to regulating air
gases and rules in relation to
pollutants, such as carbon and greenhouse
05
fuels, auto emission standards, etc.'
Under § 307(d), the EPA must begin the rulemaking process for any
new regulations by publishing notice of the proposed rule in the Federal
Register. 0 6 The notice must include a statement of the rule's purpose and
basis, as well as a summary of the factual data on which the proposed rule is
based, the methodology utilized in obtaining the factual data, and any major
legal interpretations and policy considerations that underlie the proposed
rule. 107
At the time the proposed rule is published, the EPA must also
publish a rulemaking docket. 0 8 In the docket, the EPA must include all
documents it relied on to support its proposal, as well as all drafts of the9
0
proposal that were provided to the Office of Management and Budget.1
Section 307(d) further requires that the EPA allow for at least thirty days of
public comment followed by an opportunity for a public hearing. 110 The
EPA must then subsequently supplement the rulemaking docket with all
comments, or other documents that "'become available after the proposed
rule has been published and which the Administrator determines are of
central relevance to the rulemaking,"' such as a summary of comments
received and the EPA's responses."' The final rule is promulgated by
publication in the Federal Register, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 553(b),
10' 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
102 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2012).
103 THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 695 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli eds., ABA Publishing
3d ed. 2013).
'04 Id. at 696.
10sId.
106 Id.; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ('[N]otice should be sufficiently
descriptive of the 'subjects and issues involved' so that interested parties may offer informed criticism
and comments."); see, e.g., Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
107 THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 696.
1o8Id.
'09 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(2) (2012).

"0 THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 697; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(5) (2012).
.. THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 697; 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii).
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rulemaking under the APA, and the EPA's final action notice must again
include a statement of the basis and purpose of the rule, the factual data,
methodology, policy considerations, and legal interpretations.' 12
Once a final rule has been promulgated, both the APA and the CAA
allow for a private party to challenge the rule through judicial review." 3
Under CAA § 307(d)(7), the U.S. Court of Appeals is vested with
jurisdiction for challenges to final rules." 4 If the rule is challenged under §
307(b) via administrative proceedings and judicial review, the D.C. Circuit
is the proper venue." 5 If the challenge is to a local or a regional-specific
action, the appropriate circuit court is the proper venue.'16
Under § 307(b), a final EPA action may be challenged if it is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."' 17 Section 307(b) also provides for challenges to rules that are
"contrary to [a] constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity" or "in
excess [to] statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right.""' 8 Another challenge allowed under this Section is a failure
to observe the procedures required by law." 9 Generally, the most successful
challenges to an EPA final rule are challenges that the rule was promulgated
without observing the proper procedure; the rule is arbitrary or capricious,
120
and the rule exceeds the EPA's legal authority.
According to § 302(a)(2), citizens may file an action in federal
district court in order to compel the EPA to perform duties that are "nondiscretionary.' 12' The CAA allows for the compulsion of the EPA to
comply with statutory deadlines, or a deadline suit.122 Tn a deadline suit,
the citizen must file a sixty-day notice of intent to sue, and then file the
complaint in the appropriate court when the sixty days have run. 123 Such a
suit allows for the plaintiff to recover attorney fees if he or she is
successful. 124 More often than not, the suits that are brought by
environmental groups are usually settled; and the negotiations conclude with
the filing of a consent decree asking the court to set the final schedule for

112THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 697; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §
7607(d)(3).
n3 Rubin, supra note 68, at 101; THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supranote 102, at 699.
114THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 699-700.
5 Id. at 700. But see Friends of the Earth v. U.S. EPA, 934 F. Supp. 2d 40, 41 (D.D.C. 2013)
("[P]laintiff's claim does not satisfy the condition for jurisdiction ... .
116 THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 700.

11742 U.S.C. § 7607.
118Id.
942
, U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(D).

120 THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 703.

12' 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
122THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supranote 103, at 706.

12342 U.S.C. § 7604.
124 Id.
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the EPA to abide by nondiscretionary actions.1 25
III. ANALYSIS
Sue-and-settle denies meaningful participation in rulemaking, lacks
transparency, and undermines the mechanisms put in place to hold
politicians accountable to the people. With respect to the APA, sue-andsettle destroys the ability of citizens to have sufficient participation in
shaping the rules that affect the country's industries. Additionally, there is a
lack in transparency in government actions as sue-and-settle occurs behind
closed doors, and it further creates tensions among the different branches of
government.
A. APA Is Undermined
The Supreme Court encourages procedures that simplify complex
litigation, but remains mindful that "there is 'a failure of due process . . .
where it cannot be said that the procedure adopted fairly insures the
protection of the interests of absent parties who are bound by it."" 26 Over
time, negotiated settlements have become the "tool of choice" for
environmental law disputes, as it is entirely up to the parties to negotiate the
terms, and once the settlement is submitted to the court, it is usually
approved with little revision or review.' 27
In theory, due process requirements are central to rulemaking under
the APA.' 28 The notice requirement of the APA dictates that the EPA
makes available any and all documents significant to the final rule. 29 The
EPA is also required to give adequate notice and opportunity for affected
industries to comment. 3 ° The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
has stated that an adequate comment and notice period turns on "whether the
125

THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 706; see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Johnson, 444 F.

Supp. 2d 46, 52-53 (D.D.C. 2006).
126 Christopher D. Man, The ConstitutionalRights of Nonsettling Potentially Responsible Parties in
the Allocation of CERCLA Liability, 27 ENVTL. L. 375, 382 (1997) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 42 (1940)). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the foundation
of American jurisprudence, guarantees that "[n]o person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127 Timothy K. Webster, Protecting Environmental Consent Decrees from Third Party Challenges,
10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 142 (1990).
1285 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Margret Carde, Can Bambi Ride Herd over Godzilla? The Role of
Executive Oversight in EPA's Rulemakingfor the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J.
643, 663 (1996). But see Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915).
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracticable that every one should have
a direct voice it its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting
or an assembly of the whole. General statutes ... are passed that affect the person or property of
individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard.
ld
129Carde, supra note 128, at 663-64.
1305 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012); see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. V. U.S. EPA, 824 F.2d
1258, 1282 (1st Cir. 1987).
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commenters have had a fair opportunity to present their views on the
contents of the final plan."'' Similarly, under the CAA, the only way for
persons outside the EPA to voice their concerns before the agency, in an
132
attempt to shape the result, is to participatein the rule making process.
A consensus amongst courts is that the notice and comment
requirements of § 553(b) of the APA are to allow the public to participate in
the promulgation of rules. 13 3 In National Retired Teachers Association v.
U.S. Postal Service, the Court stated that, "as a general rule, thirty days
notice for solicitation of comments must precede all substantive, or
legislative, rules and those interpretive rules which both constitute a change
in prior agency position and have a 'substantial impact on private rights and
obligations."" 3 " Although affected parties are eventually afforded an
opportunity to comment on a proposed rule, sue-and-settle undermines the
underlying purpose of § 553(b).1 5 The sue-and-settle tactic allows certain
stakeholders, namely plaintiff-environmental group and defendant-EPA, a
seat at the table while leaving other stakeholders out, such as states,
businesses, and consumers. 3 6 Further, when a negotiated settlement forces
the EPA's hand, the notice and comment period becomes much less
meaningful. 37
When it comes to negotiating behind closed doors, cries from both
sides of the political spectrum are loud. In 2003, the State of Utah and the
federal government under President George W. Bush entered into a
settlement agreement concerning 2.6 million acres of wilderness in the Red
Rock Canyons of Southern Utah, and the extent to which that land was
opened up for commercial development.'3 8 The settlement's critics asked
several key questions: Where was the communication with the owners of the
land?; where was the consultation with Congress on its options to designate
the land as wilderness?; where was the cooperation with other states that
might have supported expanding the wilderness areas?; and where was the
1' Natural Res. Def.Council, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1283.
132THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, supra note 103, at 695 (emphasis added).
13'Russell G. Donaldson, Exceptions under 5 US.C.A.§ 553(b)(A) and§ 553(b)(B), 45 A.L.R. FED.
12, 24 (1979).
' Nat'l Retired Teachers Ass'n v. U.S. Postal Serv., 430 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D.D.C. 1977) (quoting
KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES SUPPLEMENTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

TREATISE § 6.01-7 (1976)).
...E.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting
that the agency failed to notify interested parties of the scientific research it relied upon to fashion the
proposed rule). In considering the underlying purposes of notice and comment in rulemaking, the Court
stated "[w]e can think of no sound reasons for secrecy or reluctance to expose to public view ... the
ingredients of the deliberative process." Id.
' Press Release, Oklahoma Office of the Attorney General E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General Pruitt
Leads Multi-State Lawsuit Demanding Transparency in EPA's Sweetheart Settlements with
Environmental Groups (July 16, 2013), http://www.oag.state.ok.us/oagweb.nsf/0/4483F57934B29C
IF86257BAA00635C21 !OpenDocument.
131 Id; Bell, supra note 17.
...Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush 11, 14 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 397 (2004).
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consideration for the conservation values abandoned in the haste to strike a
deal?' 39 In discussing this settlement and others, critics opined "the
Secretary's willingness to enter into an agreement with such sweeping
140
implications without any public involvement is outrageous.'
Criticism from the other side of the aisle recently escalated to the
form of a lawsuit against the EPA. 14 1 In 2013, Oklahoma Attorney General
E. Scott Pruitt and eleven other attorneys general filed suit against the EPA
in federal court seeking to compel the EPA to comply with a Freedom of
Information Act request. 142 The request pertained to the EPA's negotiations
with certain organizations that led to binding consent decrees regarding
14 3
various states' Regional Haze State Implementation Programs ("SIPs").
Attorney General Pruitt and other critics allege "'[t]he EPA is picking
winners and losers, [and] exhibiting favoritism, at the expense of due
process .... ""44
In New York v. EPA, the parties entered into an agreement with
sweeping implications, but with a total lack of public participation in the
agreement; participants in the settlement included representatives of the
eleven states, the Nat-aral Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the EPA. 45 The settlement agreement
contains two parts. First, the EPA will sign and transmit to the Office of the
Federal Register by July 26, 2011, a proposed rule under § 111(b) of the
CAA, which includes standards of performance for greenhouse gas
emissions for new and modified EGUs. 146 Second, the EPA will also sign
and transmit a proposed rule under § 111(d) that includes emission
guidelines for existing EGUs. 14 Like the 2003 Southern Utah Red Rock
Canyon settlement, critics may ask similar key questions: Where was the
communication with business owners?; where was the consultation with
Id. at 398.
Id. at 400.
141 See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 3, Oklahoma v. EPA, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 177381 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 18, 2013); see also Stephen Moore, Stephen Moore: Using 'Sue
and Settle' to Thwart Oil and Gas Drillers, WSJ.coM (Oct. 4, 2013, 6:44 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304176904579115234181105684.
142 Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 141, at 2-3; see also MOORE, supra
note 141.
141Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 141, at 10-11.
Due process
'44 Oklahoma Office of the Attorney General E. Scott Pruitt, supra note 136.
implications of sue-and-settle are outside the scope of this comment. For a brief discussion on the extent
to which consent decrees must comport with due process, and the permissibility of third parties to attack
negotiated settl-"ents via collateral attack see Webster, supra note 127, at 144-50.
141Modification to Settlement Agreement at 1, New York v. EPA, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22688
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1322), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201309/documents/20110613ghgsettlementmod.pdf.
'40

146

id.

147Id. Under the terms of the settlement, the EPA would have six months to develop guidelines for

greenhouse gas emissions from electronic generating units. Bill Wemhoff, The National Rural Electric
Cooperative Associations Comments on ProposedSettlement Agreement New York, et al. v. EPA, No 061322, (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.ect.coop/wp-content/uploads/2011/02fNSPSsetCmts-2.pdf.
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Congress on its options to set emission guidelines for electric generating
units?; where was the cooperation with other states that might have opposed
setting the emission standards?; where was the consideration for the costs of
compliance in the haste to strike a deal?' 48
Noticeably absent from the 2006 lawsuit were the companies in the
energy industry most affected by the new regulation.' 4 9 Six years later, in
2012, several leading companies in the energy industry were afforded the
opportunity to respond to the negotiated settlement.15 ° Participants in
response, collectively known as the "Associations," included companies
such as the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Chemistry
Council, the American Iron and Steel Institute, the American Petroleum
Institute, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, among others."'
In a letter added to the EPA's docket concerning greenhouse gas
emissions for new stationary sources, the Associations pointed out that with
the new regulations, "the EPA is effectively dictating both fuel choice and
design choice for new electric utility generating units ("EGUs"), contrary to
Congressional intent and the EPA's authority as a regulator of the
environment, not energy." '
The letter cited a cost analysis study
conducted by the South Dakota Department of Environment and Natural
Resources that estimated that in order to comply with the regulation, it
would cost the Hyperion Energy Center, a facility located in South Dakota,
$1 billion or more.'
The letter goes on to note that both Michigan and
Illinois reached similar conclusions on the cost of the new regulation and the
technical infeasibility of the EPA's regulation.154 Since the EPA was
determined to affirm the terms of the settlement agreement, the
Associations' efforts to dissuade the EPA were futile.' 55 The negotiated
settlement in New York v. EPA undermines the very purpose for which the
141Parenteau, supra note 133, at 398; see also Mark Clayton, EPA Issues New Rules on Greenhouse
Gas Emissions: Where Does That Leave Coal?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.con/USA/Politics/2012/0327/EPA-issues-new-rule-on-greenhouse-gas-emissionsWhere-does-that-leave-coal ('Higher utility bills and fewer jobs are the only certain outcomes from this
reckless attempt to override Congress's repeated refusal to enact punitive caps on carbon dioxide
emissions."').
141Coke Oven Envt'l Task Force v. EPA, No. 06-1131, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23499 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 13, 2006). Out of the numerous affected industries, only Utility Air Regulatory Group intervened
in the lawsuit.
110Letter from Nat'l Assoc. of Mfrs. et al., to U.S. EPA, Re: Standards of Performance for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Docket ID
No. EPA-HG-OAR-2011-0660; FRL-9654, 77 Fed. Ref 22392, 1 (Jun. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.nam.org/-/media/53E86E050C7A495A9CC84F9778BA1F10/AssociationGHGNSPS Co
mments June_25 2012.pdf [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE].
151Id
"I Id. at 4.
153Id. at 18.
114Id. But see JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43127, EPA STANDARDS FOR
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM POWER PLANTS: MANY QUESTIONS, SOME ANSWERS 7 (2013) (In
its own cost-benefit analysis, the EPA stated the "[T]he Agency does not anticipate any notable impacts
on the price of electricity or energy supplies.").
. See infra note 181.
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APA was enacted; to increase public participation in rulemaking, and as a
result, billions of dollars in compliance costs are now imposed upon
businesses whom were never afforded an opportunity to participate in the
negotiated settlement between the environmental groups and the EPA. 56
B. Lack of Transparency
In order to ensure the government is representative of the people's
interests, certain mechanisms have been built into the system to hold
politicians accountable to the people.'5 7 Political accountability is achieved
through elections, separation of powers, and checks and balances.' 5 8 Sueand-settle undermines all these mechanisms. Sue-and-settle circumvents the
procedural safeguards of two pieces of legislation enacted by Congress, the
APA and the CAA.' 5 9 Additionally, the EPA breeds mistrust from affected
industry participants because sue-and-settle trumps fairness in sound
environmental policy and lacks transparency. 6 °
The regulation of greenhouse gases began in accordance with the
safeguards set forth in the APA. In 1999, the International Center for
Technology Assessment ("ICTA") and eighteen other organizations filed a
petition with the EPA requesting it begin regulating greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicle engines. 161 On January 23, 2001, the
EPA published a notice seeking comment on the petition. 162 Following the
comment period, on September 8, 2003, the EPA published a notice denying
the petition for rulemaking stating it did not believe the CAA authorized
regulations that dealt with global climate change. 63 In 2003, the ICTA,
several states, and environmental organizations appealed to the D.C. Circuit
156

Donaldson, supra note 133, at 24; Modification to Settlement Agreement, supra note 145, at 1.

Alicia Adsera, Are You Being Served? PoliticalAccountability and Quality of Government, 9 J.L.
ECON & ORG. 445,445-46 (2003), availableat http://jleo.oxfordjoumals.org/content/19/2/445.full.pdf
...Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, Separation of Powers and Political
Accountability, Q.J. ECON. 1163, 1164-65 (Nov. 1997), available at http://qje.oxfordjoumals.org/
content/I 12/4/163. full.pdf+html.
1'9 Tom C. Clark, 1947 Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE DATABASE 9 (2001), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/
admin/1947cover.html (The essential purpose of the APA is to require agencies to keep the public
informed of their organization, procedures, and rules; to provide for public participation in the
rulemaking process; to establish uniform standards for the conduct of formal rulemaking; and to define
the scope ofjudicial review).
"6 Bell, supra note 17 (commenting on the August 2012 FOIA lawsuit filed against the EPA, and of
EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson's resignation shortly thereafter, Senator David Vitter stated ."[ilt's
about a culture of hiding an extreme agenda from Americans because it can't be sustained in public
debate."'); see Donaldson, supra note 133, at 21. See generally Judith L. Mernit, The Environmental
Lawsuit Sue-and-Settle Spin Cycle, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.hcn.org/
issues/45.14/the-environmental-lawsuit-sue-and-settle-spin-cycle.
161 Background and History of EPA Regulation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act & NationalAssociation of Clean Air Agencies' Comments on GHG Regulatory and Policy
Proposals, NAT'L ASSOC. OF CLEAN AIR AGENCIES 2 (July 19, 2011), http://www.
nwcleanair.org/pdf/ClimateChange/Misc/History_%20EPA-RegulationGHGs-July2 I -post.pdf
[hereinafter NACAA].
'

162
163

Id. at 2.
Id.
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Court of Appeals, which issued a split decision denying the petition to
review the EPA's decision.' 64 An appeal was filed with the Supreme
Court. 165 In the meantime, in 2005, the State of California submitted a
request to the EPA that the agency waive CAA § 209(a)'s prohibition
against states adopting their own emission standards. 6 6 The EPA responded
that rather than issue the waiver request, it was awaiting the Supreme Court
decision.1 67
On April 2, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 in
Massachusetts v. EPA that the EPA had the authority to regulate greenhouse
16
gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 1
In 2008, the EPA released an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on Regulating [Greenhouse Gas] Emissions under the CAA. 169
The purpose of the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Regulating
[Greenhouse Gas] Emissions was to review potential provisions under the
CAA to regulate greenhouse gases, and the pros and cons of each potential
regulatory approach and technology for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. 7 In 2009, following a change in administration, the EPA issued
a final Endangerment Finding and moved forward with the regulation of
greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles. 7 '
With regards to greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources,
in 2009, the EPA published a proposal for the Tailoring Rule. 17 2 The
purpose of the rule was to ensure that those facilities that must already
obtain certain permits for other pollutants would now be required to include
greenhouse gases in their permits if their emissions crossed a certain
threshold.'7 3 The final rule was issued on June 3, 2010.174 Thereafter, the
EPA issued a series of rules to adapt SIPs to the thresholds of the Tailoring
Rule so that greenhouse gases were considered regulated pollutants in
applicable states.' 75
It was not until December 30, 2010, four years after the settlement
in New York v. EPA, that the EPA published a notice seeking comment on
finalizing the 2006 Final Rule regarding greenhouse gas emissions for
"6 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 50.
166 California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, TRANSPORTATION AND CLIMATE, U.S. EPA
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/ca-waiver.htm (last updated May 14,2013).
167 Id. See generallyMassachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
168 Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 532.
169 Advance Notice of ProposedRulemaking: Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean
Air Act, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/anpr/ (last updated Sept. 9, 2014).
"7 NACCA, supra note 161, at 4.
165

"I' Id. at 5.
172 Id at 7.
173 Robin Bravender, EPA Issues Final 'Tailoring' Rule for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, NY TIMES

(May 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/13/13greenwire-epa-issues-final-tailoring-rulefor-greenhouse-32021 .html.
7 NACCA, supra note 161, at 7.
'7

Id. at 7-8.
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power plants and petroleum refineries.' 7 6 The notice in the Federal Register
stated that under the proposed settlement, non-parties to the suit have thirty
days to comment on the rule, and that unless the EPA or the Department of
Justice felt that consent to the proposed settlement should be withdrawn,
"the terms of the agreement will be affirmed."' 7 7 Despite the rule
technically being a proposal to a final rule, in its notice the EPA
unequivocally makes clear that short of a non-party disclosing an earthshattering fact regarding greenhouse gases in a mere thirty days, the EPA is
resolved to affirm the settlement agreement and promulgate a final rule.' 78
In contrast, when the EPA published notice of the Tailoring Rule in 2012,
the comment period was extended to sixty days, and the EPA hosted two
public hearings so that interested parties could present various data and
arguments for or against the proposed rule.' 79 Consistent with transparency
and the essential purpose of the APA of keeping the public informed, in the
latter case, the EPA afforded interested parties an opportunity to comment
on the proposed rule the very same year it was proposed, doubled the length
of the comment period, and held public hearings.8 ° In the former case, an
opportunity for interested parties to comment on the 2006 Final Rule did not
come until years after the settlement was initially negotiated.' 8 '
Additionally, the comment period lasted for only thirty days, and resulted in
the first-ever greenhouse gas regulation of its kind imposed upon the coal
182
industry.
It is undeniable that the EPA has enormous power. What is
especially problematic about sue-and-settle is the outside participation of
environmentalists in forming the rule that is to be proposed and
promulgated. As a result of the settlement in New York v. EPA and the
subsequent rule, "'the EPA is seeking to regulate U.S. manufacturing in a
way that Congress never planned and never intended.""1, 83 Specifically, the
CAA only requires permits for certain emissions that do not include
greenhouse gases, and the "'EPA is trying to fit a political agenda into a
' 18
statute that was not designed for it.Rather than allowing environmentalist groups to petition the EPA to
176 Id.at 8; Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,392, 82,392
(proposed Dec. 30, 2010).
177 Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. at 82,392.

178 id.

179Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg.
57,126, 57,126 (proposed Nov. 4, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
1s0Id.
181 Id.

182 Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. at 82,392; see also
Kovacs, supra note 2, at 34.
113 Juliet Eilperin, Supreme Court Lets EPA's Climate Authority Stand, Will Review Permitting
Question, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/
wp/2013/10/! 5/supreme-court-affirms-epas-climate-authority-but-will-review-permitting-question/.
184 1d; see OYEZ, supra note 43.
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begin regulating greenhouse gases from stationary sources, the EPA entered
into an agreement with environmentalists and allowed for only thirty days of
comment before affirming the terms of the settlement.'85 A closed-door
negotiation lacks transparency, and those responsible for the ultimate
promulgation of the rule cannot be held accountable because the settlement
is binding via the court. A lack of accountability encourages affected
industries to mistrust the agency and the political administration.
C. Tension Is CreatedAmong the Branches of Government
The sue-and-settle tactic results in a tension among the three
branches of government. Sue-and-settle has the ability to create tensions
between the current executive branch and future administrations, as well as
tensions between the executive branch and the legislative branch, while
simultaneously entangling the judicial branch.
Once an agency is bound by a consent decree, the agency and its
future administrators are likewise bound by the decree.186 In 1986, U.S.
Attorney General Edwin Meese issued a report alleging that past executive
departments and agencies misused sue-and-settle and "'forfeited the
prerogatives of the executive branch in order to preempt the exercise of
those prerogatives by a subsequent administration."" 87 This compromises
the ability and duty of elected officials to serve the public's interests.188
New policies and laws are often the product of changing circumstances, and
sue-and-settle deprives future administrations of discretion granted by the
Constitution or Congress to respond to new circumstances. 8 9
Sue-and-settle additionally creates tension between the executive
branch and Congress while entangling the judiciary. By engaging in sueand-settle, agencies are able to expand their authority and simultaneously
evade congressional oversight. 9 Congress controls the funds an agency
requires to implement its regulations in the appropriation process, and these
settlements reprioritize an agency's budget.' 9' Once a court approves a
..
5 Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg. at 82,392.
186 Tseming Yang, Does EPA's Sue-and-Settle Policy Circumvent the Legislative, and Regulatory
Process? THE CALIFORNIAN.COM (Dec. 21, 2013, 6:24 AM), http://www.thecalifomian.com/article/
20131221/OPINION05/312210028/Does-EPA-s-sue-settle-policy-circumvent-legislative-regulatoryprocess-.
1"7Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal
EnvironmentalPolicy Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 337 (1987).
18 Andrew M. Grossman, Regulation Through Sham Litigation: Sue andSettle Phenomenon, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/02/regulationthrough-sham-litigation-the-sue-and-settle-phenomenon.
189 Memorandum from Edwin Meese 1II, Attorney General, to All Assistant Attorneys General and
All United States Attorneys on Department Policy Regarding Consent Decrees and Settlement
Agreements (Mar. 13, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-891/Acc06O [hereinafter MEMORANDUM].
9 Executive Summary, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://www.uschamber.com/sue-and-settleexecutive-summary (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
191 Id.
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consent decree, an agency is permitted to tell Congress it is compelled to
publish a new regulation.19 2 Equally troublesome is the commitment the
agency has made in the settlement to obtain funding from the legislative
branch, and the position in which it places the judicial branch in its
enforcement of the consent decree, because obtaining funding for a
regulation is a separate political act.193 Additionally, when an agency
becomes bound by a consent decree, the agency's power to exercise
discretion in promulgating a regulation no longer lies with the agency
administrator, but rather that discretion is now subject to the court's
94
approval or disapproval.
In New York v. EPA, litigation against the federal government
commenced as a direct result of the Bush Administration's unwillingness to
regulate greenhouse gases. 95 In 2006, the EPA was operating under the
premise that the CAA did not give them authority to regulate such
emissions, and thus declined to do so. 19 6 Unsatisfied, a group of petitioners
took the matter to the courts in order to obtain a binding consent decree to
force the EPA into promulgating rules to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions.' 97 Petitioners were wholly successful, and the EPA is now able
to regulate those emissions through the very same statute that the EPA
claimed it lacked authority to regulate under less than a decade ago. 198
Moreover, future administrations are now bound by these regulations,
irrespective of public opinion and the agendas of future-elected
administrations.' 99
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

With a demonstrated abuse of sue-and-settle, it is necessary that
Congress take action.2" 0 The settlement agreements that result in a new
regulation have a substantial impact on the affected industry. Additionally,
there is no requirement that the public be given notices of settlements
Id; Gray, supranote 36, at 3; MEMORANDUM, supra note 189.
Grossman, supra note 188.
94 Id.; see also MEMORANDUM, supranote 189, at 2.
'9'Robert B. Moreno & Peter Zalzal, Greenhouse Gas Dissonance: The History of EPA's
Regulations and
the Incongruity of Recent Legal Challenges, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 121, 133 (2012).
196 Teal Jordan White, Clean Air Act Mayhem: EPA 's Tailoring Rule Stitches Greenhouse Gas
Emissions into the Wrong Regulatory Fitting, 18 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 407, 410 (2011) (Prior to
Massachusetts v. EPA, "the EPA concluded that it lacked the authority to regulate new vehicle emissions
under the Clean Air Act because Congress did not intend for greenhouse gases to be regulated under the
Act and that carbon dioxide was not an 'air pollutant' as defined by the Act.").
192
193

197 Id. at 419.

191 Settlement Agreement, supranote 10, at 3; White, supranote 196, at 410.
199

Grossman, supra note 188.

200"It is extraordinary for an administration already well into its second term to decry abuses by

executive agencies, but the change in Justice Department policy does not stem from contemporary
abuses. It apparently is a result of the Reagan Administration's frustration with its failure to overturn
employment discrimination consent decrees entered during [the Carter Administration]." Percival, supra
note 187, at 337.
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between the government and private parties; rather, it is up to persons in the
2
affected industries to closely monitor litigation that might have an effect. 1'
This puts an unnecessary burden on industries, particularly those lacking the
resources to adequately monitor such litigation. In order to curb this abuse,
Congress has two options: amend the APA or pass the Sunshine for
Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013.
A. Amend the APA
Until a few decades ago, courts did not consider a settlement
agreement by an agency as rulemaking. 0 2 As settlement agreements are
regularly accepted by the EPA, "a consent decree should be no less
susceptible to [public participation] than other rulemaking or adjudicatory
proceedings.''20 3 However, courts have consistently held that proposed
settlement agreements are exempt from the APA's notice and comment
requirements because the settlements are not rules within the meaning of the
APA.2 °4 Specifically, courts have deemed settlement agreements as
"'preliminary to the rulemaking process' to constitute rulemaking. '20 5
Courts had begun to expand APA procedures for informal rulemaking, but
the Supreme Court effectively put a halt to that process by declaring that
only the minimal requirements of APA notice and comment requirements
apply to informal rulemaking via negotiated settlements.20 6
Section 553 of the APA states, in part, "[g]eneral notice of proposed
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register," and "[a]fter notice
required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation., 2 7 Not contained within the APA is the requirement that
notice be given to interested parties that litigation has commenced, and that
the litigation is likely to result in a new proposed rule, and ultimately a final,
promulgated rule. 2 8 Sue-and-settle advocates point to the fact that even
after a negotiated settlement, the public has an opportunity to comment on

201

Id.at 349.

202 Marina T. Larson, Consent Decrees and the EPA: Are They Really Enforceable Against the

Agency?, 1 PACE ENVTL. L. R. 147, 149 (1983).
203 Id. at 157-58.
204 Id.at 159-60.
205 Id.at 159.
20 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L. J. 1241, 1255-56

(1985); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 54849 (1978).
2075 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012).
200 Id.;
see also Daniel Int'l Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 656 F.2d 925,
932 (4th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he [Administrative Procedure] Act 'does not require an agency to publish in
advance every precise proposal which it may ultimately adopt as a rule."') (quoting Spartan Radiocasting
Co. v. FCC 619, F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980).
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the agreement, consistent with the requirements of the APA. 209 However,
despite the limited window for public comment, most of the content of the
settlement and proposed rule was already discussed during private
negotiations, and no record exists of the discussion; thus an affected
industry is at a disadvantage in attempting to influence the EPA's decision
thereafter with their comments.2 1 °
An amendment to the APA that gives third parties notice of the
pending litigation against government agencies and subsequent settlements
would help curb the abuses of sue-and-settle. First, third parties, regardless
of their size, would no longer be burdened with monitoring all of the
litigation within the federal court system. Second, affected industries could
intervene in the lawsuit and be afforded the opportunity to participate in
meaningful discussions regarding new potential regulations before the EPA
is resolved to propose a new rule. As the procedural safeguards of the APA
have since been sidestepped, both benefits of an amendment are consistent
with Congress' initial purpose of enacting the APA, to give the public the
opportunity to participate in the process and procedures of rulemaking. 2 1
B. Pass the Sunshinefor Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013
In the alternative, to curb the abuses of sue-and-settle, Congress
could pass the Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of
2013. The bill was introduced in April 2013, and is "strongly" supported by
numerous organizations in the business industry.212 The bill requires an
agency, against which a civil action is brought, to publish notice of the
complaint no later than fifteen days after receiving service of such
complaint. 21 3 The bill additionally requires that an agency seeking to enter
into a settlement agreement must make the agreement available to the public
by publishing it in the Federal Register no later than sixty days before the
settlement is filed with the court.214
Several industries support the passage of this bill as it "promote[s]
principles of good government, including openness and transparency, in the
regulatory process."2 5 The bill does not prevent agencies from entering into
209 Gaba, supra note 206, at 1260.
210 Id. at 1269.
211 KOCH, supranote 6, at 47; see also Donaldson, supra note 133.

212Multi-Industry Letter Supporting the "Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of
2013, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Apr. 10, 2013, 8:00 PM), http://www.uschamber.com/issues/
letters/2013/letter-regarding-sunshine-regulatory-decrees-and-settlements-act; see also James Valvo,
Letter of Support: Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlement Act of 2013 (H.R. 1493, S. 714),
AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY (May 23, 2013), http://americansforprosperity.org/legislativealerts/letterof-support-sunshine-for-regulatory-decrees-and-settlement-act-of-2013-h-r- 1493-s-714.
213 Sunshine for Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013 (H.R. 1493), GOVTRACK.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1 13/hr1493#summary (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
214 Id.(emphasis added).
215 Id.
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settlement agreements; however, the bill significantly increases the
likelihood that affected industries will have an opportunity to participate in
the rulemaking process. With notice at the outset of litigation, potentially
affected industries will have the opportunity to intervene in the suit and
participate in the negotiation process. Additionally, notice of a settlement
prior to it being filed with the court will also afford the opportunity for
public participation before the settlement becomes binding.
V. CONCLUSION

Over the last several decades, the utilization of sue-and-settle has
become systematic. Sue-and-settle is a tactic consistently used to advance
policy perspectives of certain administrations that would otherwise not be
upheld by Congress. The utilization of this tactic shirks the safeguards put
in place by the APA and undermines the principles of due process,
separation of powers, transparency, and political accountability. Congress
must act either by amending the APA or passing the Sunshine for
Regulatory Decrees and Settlements Act of 2013 to ensure certain industries
are not burdened by regulations they never had a say in to begin with. The
EPA has tremendous power to affect industry, and it must be prevented from
abusing sue-and-settle to enhance its regulatory power.
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